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ABSTRACT. Recent initiatives by a number of OECD
governments suggest considerable interest in emulating the
Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, a piece of legislation that is widely
credited with stimulating significant growth in university–
industry technology transfer and research collaboration in
the US. We examine the effects of Bayh-Dole on university–
industry collaboration and technology transfer in the US,
emphasizing the lengthy history of both activities prior to 1980
and noting the extent to which these activities are rooted in the
incentives created by the unusual scale and structure (by com-
parison with Western Europe or Japan) of the US higher edu-
cation system. Efforts at ‘‘emulation’’ of the Bayh-Dole policy
elsewhere in the OECD are likely to have modest success at
best without greater attention to the underlying structural dif-
ferences among the higher education systems of these nations.
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1. Introduction
The relationship between academic research and
industrial innovation was a central focus of Edwin
Mansfield’s research agenda. His papers on
academic research and industrial innovation
(1991, 1995) were important early contributions
to the large literature on the economic benefits of
US university research. Mansfield found a high
social rate of return to investment in academic
research performed between 1960s and 1970s, as
well as important complementarities and feed-
backs between the ‘‘basic’’ and ‘‘commercially ori-
ented’’ research by academic researchers.
Mansfield’s findings were published near the peak
of the ‘‘competitiveness debate’’ of the 1980s and
early 1990s within the US over issues such as the
alleged failure of US firms to exploit academic
research more effectively for commercial advan-
tage. These concerns contributed to the passage of
the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, which sought to facili-
tate patenting and licensing by US universities of
inventions based on federally funded research.
The Bayh-Dole Act was followed by signifi-
cant growth in patenting and licensing by US
universities, and a number of assessments have
argued that expansion in these activities
enhanced the social returns to publicly funded
research academic. Although tenuously anchored
in empirical evidence, these assessments and
other factors have led governments in many
OECD countries to consider policy initiatives
that emulate the Bayh-Dole Act. This paper
examines the effects of Bayh-Dole on univer-
sity–industry collaboration and technology
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transfer in the US. There is a long history of
such collaboration and technology transfer in
the US university system stretching far back
into the pre-1980 period, and these activities
have been rooted in the incentives created by
the unusual scale and structure (by comparison
with many Western European nations or Japan)
of the US higher education system. Based on
this analysis, we argue that efforts at ‘‘emula-
tion’’ of the Bayh-Dole policy elsewhere in the
OECD are likely to have modest success at best
without greater attention to the underlying
structural differences among the higher educa-
tion systems of these nations.
The global diffusion of these policies illustrates
a phenomenon that has received little attention
in the literature on innovation policy—the efforts
by policymakers to ‘‘borrow’’ policy instruments
from other economies and apply these instru-
ments in very different institutional contexts.
History, path dependence, and institutional
‘‘embeddedness’’ all make this type of ‘‘emula-
tion’’ very difficult. Nonetheless, such emulation
has been especially widespread in the field of
technology policy, most notably in the area of
collaborative R&D policies.
Our critique of the efforts to emulate the
Bayh-Dole Act relies in part on a survey of
recent evidence on the characteristics of the
university–industry knowledge exchange and
technology transfer, discussed in Section 2. We
discuss the effects of Bayh-Dole, relying on
evidence from the pre- and post-1980 periods,
in Section 3. Section 4 provides an overview of
efforts of other OECD nations to emulate the
Act, and Section 5 concludes.
2. How does academic research influence industrial
innovation? A review of recent studies
A number of recent studies based on interviews
and surveys of senior industrial managers in
industries ranging from pharmaceuticals to elec-
trical equipment have examined the influence of
university research on industrial innovation, and
thereby provide additional insight into the role of
universities within the US national innovation
system. All of these studies (Cohen, et al., 2002;
GUIRR, 1991; Levin et al., 1987; Mansfield,
1991) emphasize the significance of interindustry
differences in the relationship between university
and industrial innovation. The biomedical sector,
especially biotechnology and pharmaceuticals, is
unusual, in that university research advances
affect industrial innovation more significantly
and directly in this field than is true of other
sectors.
In these other technological and industrial
fields, universities occasionally contributed rele-
vant ‘‘inventions,’’ but most commercially signifi-
cant inventions came from nonacademic
research. The incremental advances that were the
primary focus of the R&D activities of firms in
these sectors were almost exclusively the domain
of industrial research, design, problem-solving,
and development. University research contributed
to technological advances by enhancing knowl-
edge of the fundamental physics and chemistry
underlying manufacturing processes and product
innovation, an area in which training of scientists
and engineers figured prominently, and experi-
mental techniques.
The studies by Levin et al. (1987) and Cohen
et al. (2002) summarize industrial R&D manag-
ers’ views on the relevance to industrial innova-
tion of various fields of university research
(Table I summarizes the results discussed in
Levin et al., 1987). Virtually all of the fields of
university research that were rated as ‘‘impor-
tant’’ or ‘‘very important’’ for their innovative
activities by survey respondents in both studies
were related to engineering or applied sciences.
These fields of US university research frequently
developed in close collaboration with industry.
Interestingly, with the exception of chemistry,
few basic sciences appear on the list of university
research fields deemed by industry respondents to
be relevant to their innovative activities.
The absence of fields such as physics and
mathematics in Table I, however, should not be
interpreted as indicating that academic research
in these fields does not contribute to technical
advance in industry. Instead, these results reflect
the fact that the effects on industrial innovation
of basic research findings in such areas as phys-
ics, mathematics, and the physical sciences are
realized only after a considerable lag. Moreover,
application of academic research results may
require that these advances be incorporated into
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the applied sciences, such as chemical engineer-
ing, electrical engineering and material sciences.
The survey results summarized in Cohen et al.
(2002) indicate that in most industries, university
research results play little if any role in triggering
new industrial R&D projects; instead, the stimuli
originate with customers or from manufacturing
operations. Pharmaceuticals is an exception, since
university research results in this field often trig-
ger industrial R&D projects.
Cohen et al. (2002) further report that the
results of ‘‘public research’’ performed in gov-
ernment laboratories and universities were used
more frequently by US industrial firms (on aver-
age, in 29.3% of industrial R&D projects) than
prototypes emerging from these external sources
of research (used in an average of 8.3% of
industrial R&D projects). A similar portrait of
the relative importance of different outputs of
university and public-laboratory research
emerges from the responses to questions about
the importance to industrial R & D of various
information channels (Table II). Although phar-
maceuticals is unusual in its assignment of con-
siderable importance to patents and license
agreements involving universities and public lab-
oratories, respondents from this industry still
rated research publications and conferences as a
more important source of information. For
most industries, patents and licenses involving
inventions from university or public laboratories
were reported to be of little importance, com-
pared with publications, conferences, informal
interaction with university researchers, and con-
sulting.
Data on the use by industrial R&D managers
of academic research results are needed for other
industrial economies. Nonetheless, the results of
these US studies consistently emphasize that the
TABLE I
The relevance of university science to industrial technology
No. of industries with
‘‘relevance’’ scores
Selected industries for which the reported ‘‘relevance’’
Science P5 P6 of university research was large (‡ 6).
Biology 12 3 Animal feed, drugs, processed fruits/vegetables
Chemistry 19 3 Animal feed, meat products, drugs
Geology 0 0 None
Mathematics 5 1 Optical instruments
Physics 4 2 Optical instruments, electronics
Agricultural science 17 7 Pesticides, animal feed, fertilizers, food products
Applied math/operations research 16 2 Meat products, logging/sawmills
Computer science 34 10 Optical instruments, logging/sawmills, paper machinery
Materials science 29 8 Synthetic rubber, nonferrous metals
Medical science 7 3 Surgical/medical instruments, drugs, coffee
Metallurgy 21 6 Nonferrous metals, fabricated metal products
Chemical engineering 19 6 Canned foods, fertilizers, malt beverages
Electrical engineering 22 2 Semiconductors, scientific instruments
Mechanical engineering 28 9 Hand tools, specialized industrial machinery
Source: Data from the Yale Survey on appropriability and Technological Opportunity in Industry. For a description of the survey,
see Levin et al. (1987).
TABLE II
Importance to industrial R&D of sources of information on
public R&D (including university research)
Information source
% rating it as ‘‘very important’’
for industrial R&D
Publications and reports 41.2%
Informal interaction 35.6








Source: Cohen et al. (2002).
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relationship between academic research and
industrial innovation in the biomedical field dif-
fers from that in other knowledge-intensive sec-
tors. In addition, these studies suggest that
academic research rarely produces ‘‘prototypes’’
of inventions for development and commerciali-
zation by industry—instead, academic research
informs the methods and disciplines employed by
firms in their R&D facilities. Finally, the chan-
nels rated by industrial R&D managers as most
important in this complex interaction between
academic and industrial innovation rarely include
patents and licenses. Perhaps the most striking
aspect of these survey and interview results is the
fact that they have not informed the design of
recent policy initiatives to enhance the contribu-
tions of university research to industrial innova-
tion.
3. The Bayh-Dole Act and Academic Patenting
in the United States
Origins of the Bayh-Dole Act
Although some US universities were patenting
patent faculty inventions as early as the 1920s,
few institutions had developed formal patent pol-
icies prior to the late 1940s, and many of these
policies embodied considerable ambivalence
toward patenting. Public universities were more
heavily represented in patenting than private uni-
versities during the 1925–1945 period, both
within the top research universities and more
generally. Moreover, many of the public universi-
ties active in patenting faculty inventions sought
to insulate themselves from this activity by estab-
lishing affiliated but legally separate research
foundations such as the Wisconsin Alumni
Research Foundation to manage their patent
portfolios. Other institutions relied on third-party
specialists in patent management such as the
Research Corporation (Mowery and Sampat,
2001a; 2001b).
The pre-1980 patenting activities of US univer-
sities built on research collaborations between
university and industrial researchers that spanned
many channels of technology and knowledge
exchange, including publishing, training of indus-
trial researchers, faculty consulting, and other
activities. University–industry collaboration in
turn was facilitated by the unusual structure of
the US higher education system (especially by
comparison with those of other industrial econo-
mies) during the 20th century. The US higher
education system was significantly larger,
included a very heterogeneous collection of insti-
tutions (religious and secular, public and private,
large and small, etc.), lacked any centralized
national administrative control, and encouraged
considerable interinstitutional competition for
students, faculty, resources, and prestige (see
Geiger, 1986, 1993; Trow, 1979, 1991, among
other discussions). In addition, the reliance by
many public institutions of higher education on
‘‘local’’ (state-level) sources for political and
financial support further enhanced their incen-
tives to develop collaborative relationships with
regional industrial and agricultural establish-
ments. The structure of the US higher education
system thus strengthened incentives for faculty
and academic administrators to collaborate in
research and other activities with industry (and
to do so through channels that included much
more than patenting and licensing) long before
the Bayh-Dole Act’s passage.
The collaboration between university and
industrial researchers, combined with the focus
of many US university researchers on scientific
problems with important industrial, agricultural,
or other public applications, meant that a num-
ber of US universities patented faculty inventions
throughout the 20th century. Nevertheless,
despite the adoption by a growing number of
universities of formal patent policies by the
1950s, many of these policies, especially those at
medical schools, prohibited patenting of inven-
tions, and university patenting was far less wide-
spread than was true of the post-1980 period.
Moreover, many universities chose not to man-
age patenting and licensing themselves. The
Research Corporation, founded in 1912 by
Frederick Cottrell, a University of California fac-
ulty inventor who wished to use the licensing rev-
enues from his patents to support scientific
research, assumed a prominent role as a manager
of university patents and licensing. Even in these
early decades of patenting and licensing, how-
ever, biomedical technologies accounted for a
disproportionate share of licensing revenues for
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the Research Corporation and other early univer-
sity licensors, such as the Wisconsin Alumni
Research Foundation (Mowery and Sampat,
2001b).
The decade of the 1970s, as much as or
more so than the 1980s, represented a
watershed in the growth of US university pat-
enting and licensing. US universities expanded
their patenting, especially in biomedical fields,
and assumed a more prominent role in manag-
ing their patenting and licensing activities, sup-
planting the Research Corporation. Agreements
between individual federal agencies and univer-
sities also contributed to the expansion of pat-
enting during the 1970s. Private universities in
particular began to expand their patenting and
licensing rapidly during this decade. The num-
ber of universities establishing technology trans-
fer offices and/or hiring technology transfer
officers began to grow in the late 1960s, well
before the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act.
Although the Act was followed by a wave of
entry by universities into management of pat-
enting and licensing, growth in these activities
was apparent by the late 1970s. Indeed, lobby-
ing by US research universities was one of
several factors behind the passage of the Bayh-
Dole Act in 1980. The Act therefore is as much
an effect as a cause of expanded patenting and
licensing by US universities during the post-
1960 period.
The Bayh-Dole Patent and Trademark
Amendments Act of 1980 provided blanket per-
mission for performers of federally funded
research to file for patents on the results of such
research and to grant licenses for these patents,
including exclusive licenses, to other parties. The
Act facilitated university patenting and licensing
in at least two ways. First, it replaced a web of
Institutional Patent Agreements (IPAs) that had
been negotiated between individual universities
and federal agencies with a uniform policy. Sec-
ond, the Act’s provisions expressed Congressio-
nal support for the negotiation of exclusive
licenses between universities and industrial firms
for the results of federally funded research.
Supporters of Bayh-Dole asserted that univer-
sity contributions to innovation were limited by
difficulties in patenting the outputs of federally
funded research and licensing the patents exclu-
sively to industry. This argument was particu-
larly salient during the competitiveness crisis in
the US during the 1970s, in spite of the failure
of proponents of Bayh-Dole to offer much evi-
dence in its support (see Eisenberg, 1996; Mow-
ery et al., 2004). Moreover, the Bayh-Dole
debates included no discussion of any potentially
negative effects of increased patenting and licens-
ing on the other channels through which univer-
sities contribute to innovation and economic
growth.
The passage of the Bayh-Dole Act was one
part of a broader shift in US policy toward
stronger intellectual property rights.1 Among the
most important of these policy initiatives was
the establishment of the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit (CAFC) in 1982. Established to
serve as the court of final appeal for patent cases
throughout the federal judiciary, the CAFC soon
emerged as a strong champion of patentholder
rights.2 But even before the establishment of the
CAFC, the 1980 US Supreme Court decision in
Diamond versus Chakrabarty upheld the validity
of a broad patent in the new industry of biotech-
nology, facilitating the patenting and licensing of
inventions in this sector. The origins of Bayh-
Dole thus must be viewed in the context of this
larger shift in US policy toward intellectual prop-
erty rights.
A number of scholars have documented the
role of Bayh-Dole in the growth of patenting
and licensing by universities since 1980 (Hender-
son et al., 1998). But Bayh-Dole is properly
viewed as initiating the latest, rather than the
first, phase in the history of US university pat-
enting. And this latest phase is characterized by
a higher level of direct involvement by universi-
ties in management of their patenting and
licensing activities, in contrast to the reluctance
of many US universities to become directly
involved in patenting prior to the 1970s. Public
universities were more active in patenting than
private institutions during much of the pre-
Bayh-Dole era, reflecting the strong incentives
that they faced to reap the benefits of university
research for local taxpayers and the importance
of applied research at many of these institutions.
By the 1970s, however, both public and private
universities had become directly involved in
patenting.
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The effects of Bayh-Dole
How did the Bayh-Dole Act affect patenting by
US universities? Since overall patenting in the US
grew during this period, indicators of university
patenting need to be normalized by overall trends
in patenting and R&D spending. Figures 1 and 2
present two such indicators that span the period
before and after the Bayh-Dole Act. Figure 1
depicts US research university patenting as a share
of domestically assigned US patents during 1963–
1999, in order to remove the effects of increased
patenting in the US by foreign firms and inventors
during the late 20th century. Universities
increased their share of patenting from less than
0.3% in 1963 to nearly 4% by 1999, but the rate of
growth in this share begins to accelerate before
rather than after 1980. Figure 2 plots the ratio of
aggregate university patenting at time t to aggre-
gate academic R&D expenditures at time t)1, for
application years 1963–1993.3 The Figure reveals
an increase in aggregate university ‘‘patent pro-
pensity’’ after 1981 (as pointed out by Henderson
et al., 1998), but this is the continuation of a trend
that dates at least as far back as the early 1970s;
there is no evidence of a ‘‘structural break’’ in














































































Figure 2. University patents per R&D Dollar, 1963–1993.
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Another issue of interest in academic patenting
is the distribution among technology fields of
university patents during the pre- and post-Bayh-
Dole periods. Figure 3 displays this information
for US research university patents during 1960–
1999, and highlights the growing importance of
biomedical patents in the patenting activities of
the leading US universities during the period.
Non-biomedical university patents increased by
90% from the 1968–1970 period to the 1978–1980
period, but biomedical university patents
increased by 295%. This rapid growth in biomed-
ical patents also reflected growth of the IPA pro-
gram of the major biomedical funding agency
(HEW) during the 1970s. The increased share of
biomedical disciplines within overall federal aca-
demic R&D funding, the dramatic advances in
biomedical science that occurred during the
1960s and 1970s, and the strong industrial inter-
est in the results of this biomedical research, all
affected the growth of university patenting during
this period.
After Bayh-Dole, universities increased their
involvement in managing patenting and licensing,
setting up internal technology transfer offices to
manage licensure of university patents. Figure 4
shows the distribution of years of ‘‘entry’’ by uni-
versities into patenting and licensing, defined as
the year in which the universities first devoted 0.5
FTE employees to ‘‘technology transfer activi-
ties’’ (AUTM, 1998). Although ‘‘entry’’ acceler-
ated after Bayh-Dole, growth in this measure of
university commitment to ‘‘technology transfer’’
predates Bayh-Dole. Longitudinal data on uni-
versity licensing activities are less complete, but
the available data indicate that in FY2000, US
universities signed more than 4000 license agree-
ments, representing more than a doubling since
FY1991 (AUTM, 2000).
Based on these trends in university patenting
and licensing, many observers have argued that
Bayh-Dole was a major catalyst to university–
industry technology transfer. During the late
1990s and early 21st century, many commenta-
tors and policymakers portrayed the Bayh-Dole
Act as the critical catalyst to growth in US uni-
versities’ innovative and economic contributions.
Indeed, the OECD went so far as to argue that
the Bayh-Dole Act was an important factor in
the remarkable growth of incomes, employment,
and productivity in the US economy of the late
1990s.5 Implicit in many if not all of these char-
acterizations is the argument that university pat-
enting and licensing in particular were necessary
to these asserted increases in the economic con-
tributions of US university research.6 Similar
characterizations of the effects of the Bayh-Dole
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Figure 3. Technology field of carnegie university patents, 1960–1999.
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Association of American Universities,7 the Com-
missioner of the US Patent and Trademark
Office,8 and the Technology Review, edited and
published at MIT.9
These characterizations of the positive effects
of the Bayh-Dole Act cite little evidence in sup-
port of their claims beyond simple counts of uni-
versity patents and licenses. But growth in both
of these activities predates Bayh-Dole and is
rooted in internationally unique characteristics of
the US higher education system. Nor does evi-
dence of increased patenting and licensing by
universities by itself indicate that university
research discoveries are being transferred to
industry more efficiently or commercialized more
rapidly, as Colyvas et al. (2002) and Mowery
et al. (2001) point out. Current research thus
provides mixed support at best for a central
assumption of the Bayh-Dole Act, i.e., the argu-
ment that patenting and licensing are necessary
for the transfer and commercial development of
university inventions.
In addition, of course, these ‘‘assessments’’ of
the effects of the Bayh-Dole Act fail to consider
potentially negative effects of the Act on US uni-
versity research or innovation in the broader
economy. Some scholars have suggested that
the ‘‘commercialization motives’’ created by
Bayh-Dole could shift the orientation of university
research away from ‘‘basic’’ and towards
‘‘applied’’ research (Henderson et al., 1998), but
there is little evidence of substantial shifts since
Bayh-Dole in the content of academic research.
Since US university patenting and licensing before
and after 1980 has been concentrated in a few
fields of research, notably biomedical research, a
field characterized by blurry lines between ‘‘basic’’
and ‘‘applied’’ research, this finding should not
come as a great surprise.
A second potentially negative effect of
increased university patenting and licensing is a
weakening of academic researchers’ commitments
to ‘‘open science,’’ leading to publication delays,
secrecy, and withholding of data and materials
(Dasgupta and David, 1994; Liebeskind 2001).
There are indications in this research on univer-
sity patenting and licensing that the ‘‘disclosure
norms’’ of academic research in specific fields
have been affected by increased faculty patenting,
but more research on this issue is needed. More-
over, the Bayh-Dole Act is not solely responsible
for any such changes in disclosure norms—inc-
reased opportunities for commercial gain from
basic research in such fields as academic biotech-
nology, as well as the overall strengthening of
intellectual property rights in the US, are not
themselves directly linked to Bayh-Dole. None-
theless, given the importance assigned by indus-
trial researchers to the ‘‘nonpatent/licensing’’
channels of interaction with universities in most
industrial sectors, it is crucially important that
these channels not be constricted or impeded by























































Figure 4. Year of ‘‘Entry’’ into technology transfer activities.
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Finally, the effects of any increased assertion
by institutional and individual inventors of prop-
erty rights over inputs to scientific research have
only begun to receive serious scholarly attention.
Patenting and restrictive licensing of inputs into
future research (‘‘research tools’’) could hinder
downstream research and product development
(Heller and Eisenberg, 1998; Merges and Nelson,
1994).
Although there is little compelling evidence as
yet that the Bayh-Dole Act has had negative con-
sequences for academic research, technology
transfer, and industrial innovation in the US, the
data available to monitor any such effects are
very limited. Moreover, such data are necessarily
retrospective, and in their nature are likely to
reveal significant changes in the norms and
behavior of researchers or universities only after
a long lag. Any negative effects of Bayh-Dole
accordingly may reveal themselves only well after
they first appear.
4. International ‘‘emulation’’ of the Bayh-Dole Act
Although the evidence on the effects of the Bayh-
Dole Act suggests that its ‘‘catalytic’’ effects on
university–industry technology transfer are lim-
ited, a number of other OECD governments are
considering or have adopted policies emulating
the Act’s provisions.10 In Denmark, a 1999 law
gave public research organizations, including uni-
versities, the rights to all inventions funded by
the Ministry for Research and Technology.
Under Denmark’s previous policy (established in
1957), all such rights had reverted to employees
(OECD, 2003). The German Ministry for Science
and Education in 2002 altered the ‘‘professor’s
privilege,’’ which gave academic researchers pri-
mary responsibility for the decision to file for
patent protection on inventions and granted
them the rights to any resulting patents. The new
policy requires that academic inventors inform
their employers of potentially patentable inven-
tions two months before papers disclosing such
inventions are submitted for publication, and
grants universities four months to determine
whether they wish to file for patent protection.11
In France, a 1999 law authorized the creation of
technology transfer offices at universities, and in
2001 the Ministry of Research ‘‘recommended’’
that universities and public research organiza-
tions establish policies to assert their rights to
employee inventions (OECD, 2003). The Cana-
dian Prime Minister’s ‘‘Expert Panel on the
Commercialization of University Research’’ rec-
ommended in 1999 that universities retain owner-
ship of inventions resulting from publicly funded
research, and ‘‘be held accountable for maximiz-
ing returns to Canada,’’ noting that ‘‘the pro-
posed IP policy framework will inspire a
transformational shift in culture within Canadian
universities, as happened in the US with the pas-
sage of the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980’’ (Public
Investments in University Research, p. 28).12
In varying degrees all of these initiatives cite
Bayh-Dole as one justification. Nevertheless,
they in fact differ significantly from the Act,
which sought to transfer ownership for publicly
funded inventions from government agencies to
universities and other nonprofits. In contrast to
Bayh-Dole, all of the policies described in the
previous paragraph, along with similar new pol-
icies in other European countries (e.g., Austria,
Ireland, and Spain) ‘‘have focused on changing
employment laws so that university professors
are no longer exempted from legislation that
gives employers the IP generated by employees’’
(OECD, 2003, p. 11), and seek to transfer own-
ership from individual inventors to universi-
ties.13 Similarly, the ‘‘Japanese Bayh-Dole Act’’
of 1999 shifted ownership from individual
inventors to universities (http://www.nsftokyo.
org/rm04-05.html). These initiatives thus ignore
one of the central justifications for Bayh-Dole,
i.e., that government ownership of publicly
funded inventions impedes their commercializa-
tion.
In addition to changes in intellectual property
policy an employment regulations, a number of
related initiatives aim to stimulate the organiza-
tion and activity of technology licensing offices.
Thus the Swedish, German, and Japanese gov-
ernments (among others) have encouraged the
formation of external ‘‘technology licensing orga-
nizations,’’ which may or may not be affiliated
with a given university (see Goldfarb and Hen-
rekson, 2003, for a comparison of Bayh-Dole
and Swedish initiatives to enhance university–
industry technology transfer).
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As this discussion suggests, these initiatives to
emulate Bayh-Dole differ from one another and
from Bayh-Dole itself. The policy proposals and
initiatives display the classic signs of interna-
tional emulation—selective ‘‘borrowing’’ from
another nation’s policies for implementation in
an institutional context that differs significantly
from that of the nation being emulated. Nonethe-
less, these initiatives are based on the belief that
university patenting was an essential vehicle for
effective transfer of technology from universities
to industry and that Bayh-Dole was essential to
the growth of university–industry interaction in
science-based industries in the US during and
after the 1980s. These views appear to be based
on a misreading of the limited evidence concern-
ing the effects of Bayh-Dole, however, and on a
misunderstanding of the factors that have
encouraged the long-standing and relatively close
relationship between US universities and indus-
trial innovation. More importantly, like Bayh-
Dole itself, these initiatives focus narrowly on the
‘‘deliverable’’ outputs of university research, and
ignore the effects of patenting and licensing on
the other, more economically important, channels
through which universities contribute to innova-
tion and economic growth.
In as much as patenting and licensing are of
secondary importance in most fields, emulation
of the Bayh-Dole Act is insufficient and perhaps
even unnecessary to stimulate higher levels of
university–industry interaction and technology
transfer. Instead, reforms to enhance inter-insti-
tutional competition and autonomy within
national university systems, as well as support
for the external institutional contributors to
new-firm formation and technology commerciali-
zation, appear to be more important.
Indeed, emulation of Bayh-Dole actually could
be counterproductive in other industrial econo-
mies, precisely because of the importance of
other channels for technology transfer and
exploitation by industry. A narrow-minded focus
on licensing as the primary or only channel for
technology transfer can have a chilling effect on
the operation of other important channels. There
are potential risks to the university research
enterprise that accompany increased involvement
by university administrators and faculty in tech-
nology licensing and commercialization, and
uncritical emulation of Bayh-Dole in a very dif-
ferent institutional context could intensify these
risks.
5. Conclusion
The relationship between US university research
and innovation in industry is a long and close
one. Both organized industrial research and the
US research university first appeared in the late
19th century and have developed a complex
interactive relationship. The unusual structure of
the US higher education infrastructure, which
blended financial autonomy, public funding from
state and local sources with federal research sup-
port, and substantial scale, provided strong
incentives for university faculty and administra-
tors to focus their efforts on research activities
with local economic and social benefits. Rather
than being exclusively concerned with fundamen-
tal scientific principles, much of US university
research throughout the late 19th and 20th centu-
ries focused on understanding and solving prob-
lems of agriculture, public health, and industry.
US universities have made important contribu-
tions to industrial innovation throughout the
past century, not least through by combining
advanced research and education. The strong
links between education and research sustained a
close relationship between the evolving scientific
research agenda and problems of industry or
agriculture, while at the same time providing a
powerful and effective channel (in the form of
trained students) for the transfer and application
of much of this knowledge to industry and other
economic sectors. In addition, many university
researchers in engineering and medical schools
maintained close ties with the users of their
research and their graduates in industry, medical
practice, and agriculture. The important role of
universities in industrial innovation, particularly
during the post-1945 period, also relied on insti-
tutions external to the university, including ven-
ture capitalists, equity-based financing of new
firms, and high levels of labor mobility between
academia and industry.
Based on these considerations, we believe that
much of the growth in licensing and university-
based ‘‘spinoffs’’ that has occurred since the pas-
sage of the Bayh-Dole Act almost certainly
124 Mowery and Sampat
would have occurred in the absence of this piece
of legislation. After all, US universities were
active patenters and licensors for decades before
1980, and much of their patenting and licensing
activity since 1980 has been highly concentrated
in a few fields, at least some of which also have
benefited from rapid growth in public research
funding and significant advances in basic science.
The Bayh-Dole Act thus appears to have been
neither necessary nor sufficient for much of the
post-1980 growth in university patenting and
licensing in the US. Moreover, given the very dif-
ferent institutional landscape in the national
higher education systems of much of Western
Europe and Japan, it seems likely that the ‘‘emu-
lation’’ of Bayh-Dole that has been discussed or
implemented in many of these economies is far
from sufficient to trigger significant growth in
academic patenting and licensing or university–
industry technology transfer. Indeed, there is
some question as to the necessity of a ‘‘patent-
oriented’’ policy to encourage stronger research
collaboration and technology transfer. And the
potential risks associated with such policy
changes have received too little attention.
Notes
1. According to Katz and Ordover (1990), at least 14
Congressional bills passed during the 1980s focused on
strengthening domestic and international protection for intel-
lectual property rights, and the Court of Appeals for the Fed-
eral Circuit created in 1982 has upheld patent rights in
roughly 80% of the cases argued before it, a considerable
increase from the pre-1982 rate of 30% for the Federal bench.
2. See Hall and Ziedonis (2001) for an analysis of the effects
of the CAFC and related policy shifts on patenting in the US
semiconductor industry.
3. Data on total academic R&D were obtained from
National Science Board (2000), Appendix Table 4-4.
4. As we have pointed out elsewhere (Mowery et al., 2001)
The Bayh-Dole Act did not dramatically affect the patenting
and licensing activities of universities that had long been
active in this area, such as Stanford University and the Uni-
versity of California. Indeed, the biomedical patents and
licenses that dominated these institutions’ licensing revenues
during the 1980s and 1990s had begun to grow before the
passage of the Bayh-Dole Act. Columbia University, an insti-
tution with little experience in patenting and licensing before
1980 (and an institution that prohibited the patenting of
inventions by medical faculty until 1975), also had filed for its
first ‘‘blockbuster’’ patent before the effective date of the Act.
Nevertheless, the Act did increase patenting of faculty inven-
tions at both Stanford and the University of California,
although many of these patents covered inventions of mar-
ginal industrial value and did not yield significant licensing
royalties.
5. ‘‘Regulatory reform in the US in the early 1980s, such as
the Bayh-Dole Act, have [sic] significantly increased the
contribution of scientific institutions to innovation. There is
evidence that this is one of the factors contributing to the
pick-up of US growth performance ...’’ (OECD, A New Econ-
omy?, 2000, p. 77).
6. ‘‘Possibly the most inspired piece of legislation to be
enacted in America over the past half-century was the Bayh-
Dole Act of 1980. Together with amendments in 1984 and
augmentation in 1986, this unlocked all the inventions and
discoveries that had been made in laboratories throughout the
US with the help of taxpayers’ money. More than anything,
this single policy measure helped to reverse America’s precipi-
tous slide into industrial irrelevance. Before Bayh-Dole, the
fruits of research supported by government agencies had gone
strictly to the federal government. Nobody could exploit such
research without tedious negotiations with a federal agency
concerned. Worse, companies found it nigh impossible to
acquire exclusive rights to a government owned patent. And
without that, few firms were willing to invest millions more of
their own money to turn a basic research idea into a market-
able product.’’ (Economist, 12/14/02).
7. ‘‘In 1980, the enactment of the Bayh-Dole Act (Public
Law 98-620) culminated years of work to develop incentives
for laboratory discoveries to make their way to the market-
place promptly, with all the attendant benefits for public wel-
fare and economic growth that result from those innovations.
Before Bayh-Dole, the federal government had accumulated
30,000 patents, of which only 5% had been licensed and even
fewer had found their way into commercial products. Today
under Bayh-Dole more than 200 universities are engaged in
technology transfer, adding more than $21 billion each year
to the economy.’’
8. ‘‘In the 1970s, the government discovered the inventions
that resulted from public funding were not reaching the mar-
ketplace because no one would make the additional invest-
ment to turn basic research into marketable products. That
finding resulted in the Bayh-Dole Act, passed in 1980. It
enabled universities, small companies, and nonprofit organiza-
tions to commercialize the results of federally funded research.
The results of Bayh-Dole have been significant. Before 1981,
fewer than 250 patents were issued to universities each year.
A decade later universities were averaging approximately 1000
patents a year.’’
9. ‘‘The Bayh-Dole Act turned out to be the Viagra for cam-
pus innovation. Universities that would previously have let
their intellectual property lie fallow began filing for – and get-
ting patents at unprecedented rates. Coupled with other legal
economic and political developments that also spurred patent-
ing and licensing, the results seems nothing less than a major
boom to national economic growth.’’
10. A recent OECD report (2003) argues that these initia-
tives ‘‘echo the landmark Bayh-Dole Act of 1980’’ (11).
11. The new policy aims to ensure that ‘‘more inventions are
brought to patent offices before they get published’’ and ‘‘is
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supposed to lead to active licensing transfer from university
to industry and to more companies being founded on the
basis of intellectual property conceived within the university
environment’’ (Kilger and Bartenbach, 2002).
12. Although no uniform government policy governs the
treatment of university inventions in the United Kingdom,
‘‘there is now an increasing trend for Universities to claim own-
ership’’ over academic inventions (Christie et al., 2003 p. 71).
13. In contrast to these initiatives, Italy passed legislation in
2001 that shifted ownership from universities to individual
researchers. According to Breschi et al. (2004), this policy
change has ‘‘the declared intention of finally providing the
right economic incentives for individual scientists to under-
take ‘‘useful’’ (that is ‘‘patentable’’) research’’ (2).
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